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IN THE

SUPREME COURT
OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.
LARRY D. SCHIEVING,

Case No.
13930

Defendant.

DEFENDANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Defendant was charged by the State of Utah with
mishandling of public monies, a felony in the third degree,
in violation of Section 76-8-402 (a) and (h), U. C. A. 1953,
as amended.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case was tried to a jury. From a verdict of guilty,
defendant appeals.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment in his favor
as a matter of law, or that failing, a new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The defendant, Larry D. Schieving, was employed in
the Traffic Department, Violations Division, of Salt Lake
City as assistant director of that department. Part of
his duties as assistant director was the handling of bail
money and bail receipts from the County Jail. On January 7, 1974, two copies of bail receipt No. 5450 and the
corresponding bail money of $170.00 were discovered missing by the head of the department. The defendant was
subsequently charged with mishandling of public monies
concerning the missing $170.00.
At one point during the trial the following exchange
occurred between the prosecuting attorney and the defendant on cross examination:
Q. And then when you discovered for instance
on 5450 for the $170.00 that that money was
missing as well as the missing bail receipts you
assumed somebody else stole that money? Is
that correct?

A. Yes.

I

Q. And you immediately reported that to Mr.
Budd, I presume?
A. I t was Mr. Budd who told me that that
money—that those receipts were not—he was
not able to find them. I was not the one who
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discovered that they were missing. I was approached, and then I did check after I was approached and reported back to Mr. Budd that
I could not account for what happened to the
money on those cases.
Q. And you say "those cases." There was more
than one, was there not?
Mr. White:

Object.

The Court: Overruled.
pp. 159-160, Official Transcript.
Whereupon the prosecutor was allowed by the court over
objection and after refusing to allow defense counsel to
request a proffer of proof from the prosecutor to delve
more explicitly into other shortages in the department.
At another point during the trial the prosecutor was
allowed by the court over objection to introduce evidence
concerning defendant's prior indebtedness as a possible
motive for the crime. Page 103, Official Transcript.
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING EVIDENCE OF OTHER SHORTAGES
WITHIN THE TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS BUREAU TO BE RECEIVED INTO EVIDENCE
DURING THE TRIAL.
Rule 55 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that
"evidence that a person committed a crime or civil wrong
on a specified occasion, is inadmissible to prove his dis-
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position to commit crime or civil wrong as the basis for
an inference that he committed another crime or civil
wrong on another specified occasion, but, . . . such evidence is admissible when relevant to prove some other
material fact including absence of mistake or accident,
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge
or identity."
Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence additionally
requires that the judge may, in his discretion, exclude
evidence if he finds that its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk that its admission will
create substantial danger of undue prejudice or of
confusing the issues or of misleading the jury.
The prosecution relies for admission of evidence of
other shortages upon the defendant's own statements
to the effect that he could not account for what happened
to the money on "those cases". However, the defendant's
use of the term "those cases" referred only to the other
copies of the missing receipt which he had referred to
in his previous sentence. The expression "those cases"
arose only as evidence of the defendant's confusion resulting from the form of the question put to him by the
prosecutor. This confusion could have easily been clarified at the time but the court refused to allow defense
counsel to approach the bench and explain the problem.
In 1950 the Utah Supreme Court considered the case
of State v. Harries, 118 Ut. 260, 221 P. 2d 605 (1950),
a bribery case where evidence of bribes other than the
one charged was admitted. The court upheld the adDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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mission over a vigorous dissent. This case can be easily distinguished, however, from the instant case. In Harries,
there was a substantial connection between the other
bribes and the defendant in the form of witnesses who
testified that the defendant had received other bribes.
In the present case, though, there was no criminal relationship established between the defendant and other
shortages within the department. The only evidence introduced was that other shortages existed and no evidence that the defendant was criminally responsible for
them was introduced.
Since the decision was rendered in 1950, the Harries
case has been cited by any court only once in a footnote
to a concurring opinion. State v. Winget, 6 Ut. 2d 234,
310 P. 2d 739 (1957). Although distinguished from the
present case, the dissenting opinion in Harries by Chief
Justice Pratt, quoting from a California decision, offers
some enlightening comments which are applicable to the
present case.
"Circumstantial proof of a crime charged cannot be intermingled with circumstantial proof
of suspicious prior occurences in such manner
that it reacts as a psychological factor with result that the proof of the crime charged is used
to bolster up the theory or foster suspicion in
the mind that the defendant must have committed the prior act, and the conclusion that he
must have committed the prior act is then used
in turn to strengthen the theory and induce the
conclusion that he must also have committed
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the crime charged. This is but a vicious circle.
Here the evidence of suspicious prior occurrences affords no substantial proof whatsoever connecting the defendant in any way with
the charge on which he was tried." State v.
Harries, supra at 623, quoting from People v.
Albertson, 23 Cal.2d 550,145 P.2d 7, 22.
This is precisely the situation in this case. The only
evidence of the crime charged introduced in the trial
was dmimstantiai and only more cmximstantial evidence,
if any, to connect the defendant with other shortages.
This is the type of circumstantial proof of a crime charged
intermingled with drcumstantial proof of suspicious prior
occurrences referred to by the California court. Admission of such evidence cannot be other than highly prejudicial, as well as a clear violation of the defendant's constitutional right to the presumption of innoncence.
This court has not otherwise been previously presented with this precise issue on review. However, there
are numerous cases from other jurisdictions holding that
"because of the potential for prejudice the trial judge
should act with extreme caution and any doubt as to the
admissibility of evidence of the other crime should be
resolved in favor of the defendant and against admissibility." People v. Kelly, 66 Oal. 2d 232,424 P. 2d 947; People
v. Adamson, 225 Cal. App. 2d 74, 36 Cal. Rptr. 894; DeVore v. U. S., (C. A. 9) 368 F. 2d; San Fratello v. State,
154 So. 2d 327 (Fla. App.); Gorski v. State, 1 Md. App.
200, 228 A. 2d 835; Sail v. State, 157 Neb. 688, 61 N. W.
2d 256; People v. Thau, 219 N. Y. 39,113 N. E. 556; Jones
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v. State, 321 P. 2d 432 (Okla.); Harris v. State, 88 Okla.
Crirn. 422, 204 P. 2d 305; State v. Gardner, 225 Or. 376,
358 P. 2d 557.
Utah Law is in accord with the holdings in the cases
cited above. Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence gives
the judge discretion to exclude any evidence if he finds
that its probative value is substantially outweighed by
the risk that its admission will create the risk of undue
prejudice. In this case the prejudice was substantial
because up until this point in the trial there was very
minimal and only circumstantial evidence to connect the
defendant with the cash shortage charged in the information. However, the disclosure to the jury of the fact
that there were other shortages within the departaient
coupled with the fact that the defendant had procured
a loan in order to make up one other cash shortage was
extremely prejudicial. Such a disclosure could easily give
rise to the inference in the mind of any reasonable juror!
that if the defendant had assumed responsibility for one
other shortage then he must be responsible for the cash
shortage alleged in the information. This admission then
was highly prejudicial, especially when introduced without proper foundation in the form of a proffer of proof.
If such a proffer of proof had been required it would have
been shown that the defendant did not refer to other
shortages when he mentioned "those cases."
Assuming, arguendo, that even if "those cases" did
refer to other shortages within the traffic violations department, the evidence should still have been ruled inad-
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missible because there was no criminal relationship established between the other shortages and the defendant.
In People v. Kelly, supra (1967), the California Supreme
Court considered the question of the admissibility of evidence of crimes other than the one charged. The general
rule, as in the Utah Rules of Evidence, is that evidence
of other crimes is inadmissible when it is offered to prove
criminal disposition or propensity on the part of the accused because the probative value of such evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial effect. The purpose of this
rule is to avoid placing the accused in the position of
having to defend against crimes for which he has not
been charged and to guard against the probability that
evidence of other criminal acts to prove that the defen*dant committed the crime charged would assume undue
proportion and would unnecessarily prejudice the defendant in the eyes of the jury. Kelly, supra at 953.
In no event, should evidence of such other criminal
acts be admissible unless a criminal relationship between
such acts and the defendant is established. It has frequently been recognized that because of the sound reasons behind the general rule of exclusion and for the
reasons above stated, the relevancy of evidence of other
crimes, and therefore its admissibility, must be examined
with extreme care and the evidence should be received
only with the utmost caution. Unless the criminal connection with the other crime is clearly perceived the
question must be resolved in favor of the accused. Kelly,
supra at 954, citing also People v. Albertson, supra; People
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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v. Sykes, 44 Cal. 2d 156, 280 P. 2d 769, (dissenting opinion). In every ease the possibility of severing relevant
from irrelevant portions of the evidence should be considered to protect the accused from undue prejudice. In
this case such an attempt was not made as the trial
court refused to require any proffer of proof from the
prosecutor and summarily admitted the evidence.
In the present case the only relationship established
between prior shortages in the department and the defendant was that the defendant on one occasion accepted
administrative responisbility for some missing money and
therefore endeavored to make up the difference out of
his own pocket. Nothing was introduced into evidence
that would criminally connect the defendant with the
theft of the money on the prior occasion. Had such been
the case, then the defendant should have also been
charged with that crime in order that he could properly
defend himself against such a charge. Again, this is an
example of circumstantial evidence being bolstered by
circumstantial evidence of suspicious circumstances.
There are numerous cases from other jurisdictions
with similar holdings requiring that such evidence be held
inadmissible unless the criminal relationship between the
defendant and such criminal acts is substantially established. State v. Norris, 168 So. 2d 541 (Pla.); State v.
Hines, 270 Minn. 30,133 N. W. 2d 371; State v. Freeman,
245 La. 665, 160 So. 2d 571; State v. Stephenson, 191
Kan. 424, 381 P. 2d 335; People v Donaldson, 8 111. 2d
510,134 N. E. 2d 776.
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Evidence of other shortages could be admissible if
offered to prove a particular type of modus operandi.
Such was not the case in this proceeding. The other
shortages were different from the crime charged against
the defendant. One other shortage consisted of missing
money but no missing receipts, another consisted of missing receipts only, another both missing money and misplaced receipts. One shortage even occurred subsequent
to the crime charged. Each other shortage within the
department was substantially different from the one
charged aginst the defendant. In no event was there any
criminal connection between any other shortages and
the defendant established.
On the basis of the rationale outlined above, the trial
court should have ruled that proffer of proof was required
in order to insure that, (1) "those cases" did in fact
refer to other shortages, and that (2) there was a criminal relationship established between the other shortages
and the defendant. Had such a proffer of proof been required the evidence of prior shortages within the traffic
violations bureau would have been ruled inadmissible pursuant to Rule 45 of the Utah Rules of Evidence because
of the risk that it would unduly prejudice the defendant
in the minds of the jurors. For these reasons the trial
court committed reversible error by admitting such evidence.
POINT II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE OF THE INDEBTEDNESS
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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OF THE DEFENDANT TO SHOW MOTIVE
FOR THE COMMISSION OF THE CRIME
CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION.
During the trial the prosecution was allowed to introduce evidence concerning two prior judgments and
garnishments against the defendant in order to show
a possible motive for the commission of the crime charged.
Such admission was duly objected to by the defendant.
Page 103 Official Transcript. The major objection to the
admission of such evidence is that by its admission it
deprives many persons of the Equal Protection of the
law by unduly prejudicing poor or indigenous persons.
In such cases the probative value of such evidence is far
outweighed by its prejudicial effect upon the jury. Dean
Wigmore has stated that "[U]ndoubtedly the lack of
money is logically connected with a crime of financial
gain. The trouble is that it would prove too much against
too many." Wigmore, Evidence, (3rd ed., 1940) Section
392, page 34.
Although this precise issue has never been ruled on
by this Court, many courts in other jurisdictions have
considered this question. The New Jersey Supreme Court
in State v. Mathis, 47 N. J. 538, 218 A. 2d 405, noted:
"The lack of money by A might be relevant
enough to show the probability of A's desiring
to commit a crime in order to obtain money.
But the practical result of such a doctrine
would be to put a poor person under so much
unfair suspicion and at such a relative dis-
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advantage that for reasons of fairness this
argument has seldom been countenanced as evidence of the graver crimes, particularly of violence." Mathis, supra at 538.
Such reasoning should also be applied to cases such
as the case presently before this court for exactly the
reasons outlined above. In this case the possibility
of creating substantial prejudice is equally applicable
whether the crime is a crime of violence or a so-called
"White collar" crime. The practical result of evidence of
the defendant's impecuniosaty is that it would place any
poor person immediately under grave suspicion in the
eyes of the jury and would thereby greatly disadvantage
him. Such evidence should therefore be held inadmissible.
State v. Copeland, 94 N. J. Super. 196, 227 A. 2d 523
(1967).
Prosecution arguments calling attention to the defendant's lack of funds as a possible motive for a crime
in which he attempted to obtain money has been condemned in various cases. In State v. Copeland, supra,
two young men were charged with entering a building
with the intent to steal. Although the court did not
decide that the particular type of evidence admitted was
prejudicial it did admit that the potential for prejudice
was extremely great and that in many situations such
an admission would be improper.
In People v. Moore, 26 App. Div. 2d 902, 274 N. Y.
2d 518, the New York Court reversed a robbery conviction. In a memorandum decision the court held that a
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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new trial was required in the interest of justice because
of the improper and prejudicial conduct of the prosecutor. One of the statements by the prosecutor in closing
argument which the court held to be improper concerned
the defendant being a recipient of welfare and that he
wanted to supplement that welfare allowance by a little
extra-curricular activity. In Dorger v. State, 40 Ohio
App. 415, 179 N. E. 143, the Ohio Appellate Court held
that reference to the defendant's having been reduced to
a pauper and not being able to obtain any money was
an appeal to the sympathy of the jury and was improper.
A number of cases hold that such a reference, though
improper, will not require reversal where the evidence
as to guilt is so clear that the appellate court is convinced that the jury would have reached the same result
even if the error had not occurred. In United States v.
Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., (1940), 310 U. S. 150, 60 S. Ct.
1091, the Supreme Court listed the fact that the case
was not a weak one as one of its reasons for concluding
that improper arguments of the prosecutor did not constitute prejudicial error under all the circumstances.
Conversely, any weakenss or uncertainty in the proof
of defendant's guilt will strengthen the probability that
the jury may have been influenced by the improper argument. Thus, in Read v. United States, (1930, C. A. 8
Iowa), 42 F. 2d 636, the court pointed to the fact that
the case was a close one on the facts as one reason for
regarding the prosecutor's argument concerning the
wealth of the defendants as prejudicial error.
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In People v. Fielding, 158 N. Y. 542, 53 N. E. 497,
a conviction for cxwiniving in the auditing of a fraudulent
claim against the city was reversed because of the concluding argument by the district attorney describing the
poverty and suffering of some city taxpayers and describing defendant as a thief living in a palace on the
proceeds of public plunder. The court felt that there
was a strong probability that the errors in admitting
such evidence was highly prejudicial and did affect the
verdict and therefore the conviction was reversed.
In Logan v. State, 66 Tex. Crim. 506, 148 S. W. 713,
the court concluded that although the prosecutor's improper argument and other errors noted might not in
themselves be sufficient for reversal, yet, taking them
into consideration together with the unsatisfactory state
of the evidence, the judgment should be reversed. And
in Sorrell v. State, 74 Tex. Grim. 100, 167 S. W. 356, the
fact that the evidence as to guilt was in sharp conflict
was one of the factors considered in reaching the conclusion that the prosecutor's improper argument was
prejudicial. Such reasoning even further strengthens the
prejudicial effect of this type of evidence in oases such
as the present case where any evidence of guilt was extremely weak and highly speculaitiva
On the basis of the authorities cited above it is apparent that the problem of the admission of evidence as
to the financial status of the defendant is one that has
been considered many times by courts of various jurisdictions. In the instant case the problem is substantial
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because any reference to other extrinsic factors concerning the defendant's financial status as a possible motive
of the defendant was extremely prejudicial. For this
reason the trial court erred in admitting evidence of the
defendant's prior financial condition.
POINT III.
TNE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DISMISSING THE INFORMATION AGAINST
THE DEFENDANT DUE TO THE FACT
THAT THE ORDINANCES UNDER WHICH
THE DEFENDANT WAS CHARGED DID
NOT APPLY TO THE DEFENDANT.
During the course of the trial the defendant moved
to dismiss the charge against him upon the grounds that
the information as stated did not apply to him. The information as stated required that the defendant "did
without authority of law appropriate the money to his
own use" or "willfully omitted to transfer said money
as required by law." Although the court had taken judicial notice of Sections 25-17-14 and 24-4-5 of the Salt
Lake City Ordinances, those ordinances do not apply
to the defendant.
Section 25-17-14 states that all fines and forfeitures
for the violation of ordinances and all money collected
for licenses or otherwise shall be paid into the treasury
of the corporation as prescribed by ordinance. In connection with that, Section 24-4-5 states that "the head
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of each office where fees and monies are or shall be
collected shall at the close of each day's business cover
into the city treasury all fees and monies collected by
by his office." This applies to the head of the department and not to any of his assistants. Further there is
no other statute which applies to deputies in any department.
It was not the policy of the Traffic Violations Bureau
to cover this money into the treasury each business day.
The Supreme Court has defined "cover into the treasury"
as money actually paid into the treasury as opposed to
monies deposited with the treasurer, which was the regular procedure for this office. United States v. Johnston,
668 U. S. 220, 45 S. Ct. 496. The defendant as assistant
director was not required to make those deposits. In
fact, the deposits were actually made by the head cashier even though the head of the department was required
by statute to make the deposits. The defendant was only
an assistant in a supervisory capacity and not the head
of the office. Therefore, the trial court should have dismissed the information against the defendant because
the ordinances under which he was charged did not apply
to him as assistant director.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that:
1. The trial court erred in allowing the admission
of evidence of the existence of prior shortages within the
Traffic Violations Bureau, that such error was highly
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prejudicial and can only be cured by reversal of the trial
court.
2. That the trial court erred by admitting evidence
concerning the financial condition of the defendant at
the time the shortage was discovered in order to show a
motive for the commission of the crime charged, that
such evidence was highly prejudicial and can only be
cured by reversal of the trial court.
3. That the statute under which the defendant was
charged in ifae information, U. C. A. Section 76-8-402 (a)
and (h), did not apply to the defendant by reason of
Salt Lake City Ordinances 25-17-14 and 24-4-5 and therefore the information against the defendant should have
been dismissed by the trial court.
Respectfully submitted,
DAVID PAUL WHITE
Attorney for Defendant
525 East Third South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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